Review of Michael Ruse’s book Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology, ISBN 0-674-58220-9.
by Jitse M. van der Meer.
Contents
1. Progress and Culture. 2. The Birth of Evolutionism. 3. The Nineteenth Century: From Cuvier to Owen. 4. Charles Darwin and Progress. 5. Evolution as World View. 6. The Professional Biologist. 7. Evolution Travels West. 8. British Evolutionists and Mendelian Genetics. 9. DisciplineBuilding in Britain. 10. The Genetics of Populations. 11. The Synthesis. 12. Professional Evolutionism. 13. Contemporary Debates. 14. Conclusion.
Description
Why is evolutionary thought so controversial (4)? Michael Ruse argues this is because evolutionary theory has been shaped by the idea of cultural progress (Progress). This idea has functioned as a substitute religion and that is why this study is of interest for religion and science students. The idea of Progress, however, has dimensions ranging from the political, via the economical to the social. In considering all of these dimensions and more, Ruse goes far beyond the engagement of religion and science. He concludes that a mutual engagement of evolutionary biology and the idea of Progress is inevitable, but that good evolutionary biology is possible in spite of it. This conclusion is developed using the working hypothesis that professional evolutionary biology requires a number of epistemic values. The effect of the idea of Progress on evolutionary thought, Ruse argues, has prevented it from conforming to the epistemic values and from achieving professional status of mature science.
The evidence presented in support of a causal link between the ideas of cultural progress (Progress), biological progress (progress) and evolutionary theory is three-fold. First, the biology must have the overall shape one would expect if it had been informed by the idea of Progress. One would be looking for a view of life as progressing. This demand would be satisfied, for instance, by evidence showing a transfer of the idea of artificial selection from culture to nature. What must be ruled out is the possibility that the biology has this progressive content by mere coincidence. Secondly, therefore, there must be signs indicating that the biologist personally values the idea of Progress. The third kind of proof uses the underdetermination of theories. If biological theory outstrips biological evidence in a way consistent with the idea of biological progress, this is taken as proof that the idea of Progress has affected biological theory (40).
Theory is always underdetermined by data. So how can the rationale for extending theory beyond evidence be attributed to the idea of Progress when there are other non-evidential reasons for extending it in this way? Ruse proposes that the Progressionist extension must be held against strong opposition either from a dominant anti-Progressionist line of thought, or from other non-Progressionist options or from the biologist's personal preference. For instance, there is a strong cultural trend against evolutionism in N. America. According to proof #3 this would mean that those in North America who extend the theory of evolution beyond evidence do this on account of a biological progressionism provided they can be shown to be personally committed to it (proof #2) and the remainder of their biology is consistent with this commitment (proof #1).
Ruse discusses French, German and British biologists from the 18th and 19th centuries (Chs. 2-3). Chapter four is devoted to Charles Darwin. For the post-Origin period Ruse focuses on Britain and the U.S.A. Covering biologists from before and after the rediscovery of Mendel's laws, Ruse moves from the nineteenth into the twentieth century (Chs. 5-11) including current evolutionary biology. Each chapter opens with a sketch of the relevant historical and cultural context. This is followed by a description of the ideas of selected scholars to which are applied the three criteria for a metaphoric transfer of knowledge from Progress via progress to evolutionary biology. All chapters conclude with an evaluation of how evolutionary biology has been shaped by the idea of Progress and how this affected its professional status.
Ruse finds that for two centuries the ideas of biological evolution, biological progress and human progress have been closely linked. This, Ruse argues, was a liability for anyone who wanted professional status for evolutionary biology because P/progress was associated with speculative metaphysics, it functioned as a substitute religion, it had no empirical basis, and it failed to produce economic benefits and attract grants. As a result, for the first century of its existence evolutionary thought was considered a pseudo-science. Darwin changed the status from pseudo- to popular science and so it remained for the 2nd century. While Ruse does not claim that the expulsion of the idea of P/progress from biology is necessary for the professional status of current evolutionary biology, he does claim that historically the desire to be taken as professionals was the main reason for the expulsion.
Focusing on historical description, Ruse does not analyze mechanisms for the engagement of culture and biology, but he offers interesting glimpses. We learn that thoughts of P/progress enter into evolutionary thought by being re-interpreted into forms fruitful in biology. This occurs by the use of metaphors such as Wright's adaptive landscape (448) or Simpson's “evolutionary trends” (449). Ruse emphasizes that the metaphor of the adaptive landscape does not entail progress logically and that no one would touch it if it did (450). This is why evolutionary theory can be disconnected from the idea of P/progress (460-84) which has the status of an interpretation of evolutionary theory. Hence the content of evolutionary biology is not entailed by the idea of P/progress, but that evolutionary biology may be informed by it (536). This means that the professional status of evolutionary biology is not necessarily threatened by P/progress. Perhaps this explains why Julian Huxley, Dobzhansky, Lewontin, Wilson, and Gould did not think the professional / popular divide sacrosanct.
Evaluation
The idea of P/progress is a fortunate choice. For those interested in the engagement of religion and science the concept of progress has a long history encompassing both. For one, Fisher and Dobzhansky interpreted P/progress as divine Providence, thereby engaging religion, metaphysics and science in the same way the concept of Nature did for Newton. Newton saw natural phenomena as manifestations of divine action. Fisher and Dobzhansky saw P/progress as divine Providence. This fulfills the classical condition for the merger of thought about God and Nature. Such a merger makes it impossible to separate religion and science into entities that interact. Secondly, P/progress has functioned as a substitute religion (29, 35-36). This leads to the conclusion (not drawn by Ruse) that the engagement of science and religion is not, as some argue, a thing of the past occurring only in overtly religious times and cultures. Since there is every reason to believe that the idea of P/progress will continue to function as a secular religion, so will the engagement of science and religion continue to be with us.
How strong is the evidence that Progress drives progress drives evolutionary theory? Ruse uses three proofs to detect evidence for a metaphoric transfer of knowledge from the human to the animal (and plant) realm. They are not presented as three independent pieces of evidence and should not be taken as such lest they receive undue weight. The proofs are three manifestations of one underlying metaphor representing a metaphysical commitment to P/progress. As metaphor, the idea of Progress shapes biology as a whole (#1). Metaphoricity as a characteristic of cognition involves the individual knower (#2). And metaphor as bearer of knowledge creates cognitive tension in the target domain by imposing knowledge from a source domain thereby extending theory beyond evidence (#3). If cognition is metaphorical, this linkage is unavoidable and, therefore, other independent proofs are not available. The next best thing would be to apply the same proofs to another metaphor and test its reliability.
Proof #3 has problems. Stebbins, for instance, publishes his professional evolutionary studies in specialist journals and reserves his thoughts on P/progress for the popular press (Stebbins, 429-38). His popular work is shaped by P/progress, but not his professional biology (#1). Therefore, his popular thoughts on progress necessarily outstrip the evidence (#3). Proof #3 is intended to reveal a metaphoric transfer of P/progress into evolutionary theory (39). This is a transfer from the popular to the professional domain with the effect that within professional biology the theory (recipient of the metaphoric transfer) is expected to outstrip the evidence. How relevant is it to demonstrate that the biological evidence was outstripped by Stebbin's popular views on biological progress. We need to know whether his professional theories outstripped the biological evidence. Ruse is not clear on whether proof #3 is satisfied when a professional theory or a popular opinion outstrips the evidence. This is because he does not maintain a distinction between evolutionary theory and evolutionary metaphysics.
Another problem exists with the application of proof #3. The fact that someone would go beyond the evidence (proof #3) in ways consistent with his/her personal metaphysical commitments (proof #2) is to be expected in light of what is known about the metaphoricity of cognition. Facing the unknown, knowledge can be imported from any source by metaphor, be it from metaphysics, religion, economics, sociology or popular science. Neither is it surprising that this personal commitment will show up in the overall shape of the person's biology. Thus, in order to attribute the extension of a theory beyond evidence to the influence of the idea of Progress, it becomes crucial to show the extension goes against one or more alternatives that have a strong cultural role. On this score the book is disappointing. Only in seven of the approximately forty one cases are counter trends to the extension of theory beyond evidence explicitly identified in the discussion of proof #3. These include: Agassiz (116), Owen (121), Darwin on "struggle" (166, 168), Cope (264), Dobzhansky (balance theory against classical theory, 400) Mayr (448), and Maynard Smith (480-81). Further, given a variety of sources that could shape the direction in which theory is extended how does one establish which one(s) play the causal role?
Finally, the counter trend required for proof #3 must be a functional one simply because a culture always has a variety of subcultures. Within science physics and biology have different subcultures. North America and Europe are different. Ruse's revelation offended the AAAS, but the response would have been different in Europe. In France, neo-Darwinian evolution may be seen as extended beyond evidence because the evidence is interpreted differently due to an evolution-critical history. Which culture does one look for to find a counter trend? Disregarding subcultures creates unnecessary problems. How would proof #3 apply in a predominantly P/progressionist culture? Can one argue that popular culture provides both a haven for the P/progressionism eradicated from professional biology and a non-Progressionist counter trend? Obviously, there are non-Progressionist counter trends in a culture dominated by P/progress, but this is why the author needs to demonstrate that a particular trend functions as an alternative against which a particular biologist holds his or her Progress-driven extension of theory beyond evidence. It is not enough to establish the mere availability of counter trends because that tells nothing about their acceptability to a particular biologist.
This requirement of a functional and relevant counter trend receives hardly any attention. In applying proof #3 to Darwin we learn that his Malthusianism was held against critics (165-66) and that he rejected environmental and social factors proposed by John Stuart Mill as an explanation for racial and sexual differences (168). Cope was a Lamarckist against non-Lamarckian options (264), Dobzhansky held the balance theory against the classical theory (400), Maynard Smith adopted group selection against his earlier individual selectionism (481), Wright worked for twenty five years among colleagues at the University of Chicago to whom genetics was a side issue to the fundamental problem of development (402-403), and Wilson and Lewontin engaged in mutual critique of each others forms of progressionism. If these examples were intended as counter trends, they failed because they involve rival theories within biological and cultural progressionism. In order to claim that theory extension is P/progress-driven Ruse needs a trend against P/progress at the level of metaphysics or substitute religion which is functional. This he does not provide.
A consequential assumption is that the locus of action of non-epistemic values is in the theoretical gaps left by empirical evidence. Because theory outstrips the evidence, presumably all sorts of values can slip in: political, moral, social religious. This raises a number of questions. First, why does Ruse exclude the possibility of the idea of P/progress informing the cognitive content of explanations and theories in science in addition to filling the evidential gaps. This is of key relevance if one wants to determine whether the expulsion of cultural values from science is a necessary condition for its maturity. Secondly, also in mature science theory will leave evidence behind. Therefore, the expulsion of P/progress from evolutionary biology cannot be a necessary condition for its maturity.
Ruse offers three reasons why he does not expect progressionism to disappear from mature evolutionary theory. However, these reasons will not convince non-Progressionists because they presuppose Progress as a world view. Surprisingly, Ruse downplays a more convincing reason why P/progress will not disappear from evolutionary theory. That reason does not depend on Progress. According to this reason "at the purely conceptual level, evolutionary thinking of the most professional or mature level is still pervaded by metaphors sympathetic to progress, such as "tree of life," "adaptive landscape," and "arms race." Removing phrases like these might make for epistemic purity, but doing so would also banish many epistemic virtues, like predictive fertility, and surely result in epistemic sterility." (539). This is an implicit admission by Ruse that cultural values are indispensable for mature science (see also 455). The maturing of science does not involve the wholesale replacement of cultural with epistemic values. Rather it involves, I conclude, the selective retention of those values that are good for mature science. The question is which values are good for good science. Ruse leaves us with a tension. If beliefs about P/progress fill the gaps left unexplained by science, then the elimination of the gaps and the associated maturing of science would appear to consist of the replacement of speculative beliefs with warranted knowledge, but this is not what he expects. However, if metaphors such as Wright's adaptive landscape can transform the idea of biological progress into specific working hypotheses, then the cultural knowledge informs the knowledge of nature down to the specifics of concepts, theories and explanations. The locus of action of the cultural value then is not in the gaps between evidence and theory, but in the cognitive content of biological theory itself. Since this mode of action is not logical, but cognitive it works as a scaffolding that can be erected and removed as needed.
Let me conclude by applying proof #3 to Ruse's book. His theory is that Progress drives progress which in turn drives evolutionary theory. The theory goes beyond the evidence in that its application of proof #3 is not convincing. Is there a cultural trend opposing Ruse's extrapolation that would reveal his metaphysical motivation? The AAAS culture would qualify. It is also functional in that it invited Ruse to refute Philip Johnson's book Darwin on Trial. Instead he agreed with Johnson that evolutionary theory is driven by metaphysics thereby supporting the argument of scientific creationists for the removal of the teaching of evolution from state schools. However, Ruse is not a creationist as proof #3 might suggest had there been no evidence of his Darwinism (proof #2). So what does this reveal about Ruse's metaphysical commitment to the idea that evolutionary thought is P/progress-driven? As a good naturalists he stays true to what he observes. Going against the grain of the AAAS membership he has kept this commitment with integrity and courage. The book is a pleasure to read. One can't help, but smile at the occasional “Ruse.” Who else could portray female dung flies as "archetypical Victorian maidens."