Over the past four decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will accor­ding to which it requires that agents be ultimately responsible for the creation or forma­tion of their own wills (characters and purposes). Such a view of free will is, I believe, an important part of what it means to be a self or person and to live a human life. My goal in this paper, as in past writings, is to explain how a free will of this traditional kind—which I argue is incompati­ble with determinism—can be reconciled with modern developments in the sciences and philo­sophy. A free will of the ultimate kind I defend (often called “in­compatibilist” or “libertarian”) has been under attack in the modern era since the seven­teenth century by philosophers and scientists alike as obscure and unintelligible and has been dismissed by many twentieth century thinkers for its supposed lack of fit with mo­dern images of humans in the natural and human sciences. Against these charges, I argue that an incompatibilist or non-determinist conception of free will can be defended without the usual appeals to obscure or myste­rious forms of agency (Cartesian egos, nou­me­nal selves, non-event agent causes, etc.) and can be reconciled with recent develop­ments in the sciences—physical, biological, neurological, cognitive and behavioral. Indeed, I sug­gest that some modern developments in the sciences can help to unlock certain puzzles tradi­tionally associated with free will. In the paper, I address criticisms that a nondetermi­nist free will does not allow sufficient agent control, reduces to mere chance or luck or ran­dom­ness, fails to account of moral responsibility, and the like; and I relate such a free will to the nature of the self or person and to ideas of value, rationality and autonomy.