The Varieties ofReligious Experience (excerpt)

From Lecture XVIII, "Philosophy"

What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder. The Continental schools of philosophy have too often overlooked the fact that man's thinking is organically connected with his conduct.  It seems to me to be the chief glory of English and Scottish thinkers to have kept the organic connection in view.  The guiding principle of British philosophy has in fact been that every difference must MAKE a difference, every theoretical difference somewhere issue in a practical difference, and that the best method of discussing points of theory is to begin by ascertaining what practical difference would result from one alternative or the other being true.  What is the particular truth in question KNOWN AS?  In what facts does it result?  What is its cash-value in terms of particular experience?  This is the characteristic English way of taking up a question.  In this way, you remember, Locke takes up the question of personal identity. What you mean by it is just your chain of particular memories, says he.  That is the only concretely verifiable part of its significance.  All further ideas about it, such as the oneness or manyness of the spiritual substance on which it is based, are therefore void of intelligible meaning; and propositions touching such ideas may be indifferently affirmed or denied.  So Berkeley with his "matter."

The cash-value of matter is our physical sensations.  That is what it is known as, all that we concretely verify of its conception.  That, therefore, is the whole meaning of the term "matter"--any other pretended meaning is mere wind of words.  Hume does the same thing with causation.  It is known as habitual antecedence, and as tendency on our part to look for something definite to come.  Apart from this practical meaning it has no significance whatever, and books about it may be committed to the flames, says Hume.  Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown, James Mill, John Mill, and Professor Bain, have followed more or less consistently the same method; and Shadworth Hodgson has used the principle with full explicitness.  When all is said and done, it was English and Scotch writers, and not Kant, who introduced "the critical method" into philosophy, the one method fitted to make philosophy a study worthy of serious men.  For what seriousness can possibly remain in debating philosophic propositions that will never make an appreciable difference to us in action?  And what could it matter, if all propositions were practically indifferent, which of them we should agree to call true or which false?

An American philosopher of eminent originality, Mr. Charles Sanders Peirce, has rendered thought a service by disentangling from the particulars of its application the principle by which these men were instinctively guided, and by singling it out as fundamental and giving to it a Greek name.  He calls it the principle of PRAGMATISM, and he defends it somewhat as follows:

Thought in movement has for its only conceivable motive the attainment of belief, or thought at rest.  Only when our thought about a subject has found its rest in belief can our action on the subject firmly and safely begin.  Beliefs, in short, are rules for action; and the whole function of thinking is but one step in the production of active habits.  If there were any part of a thought that made no difference in the thought's practical consequences, then that part would be no proper element of the thought's significance.  To develop a thought's meaning we need therefore only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance; and the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.  To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, we need then only consider what sensations, immediate or remote, we are conceivably to expect from it, and what conduct we must prepare in case the object should be true.  Our conception of these practical consequences is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.1

This is the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism. Such a principle will help us on this occasion to decide, among the various attributes set down in the scholastic inventory of God's perfections, whether some be not far less significant than others.

If, namely, we apply the principle of pragmatism to God's metaphysical attributes, strictly so called, as distinguished from his moral attributes, I think that, even were we forced by a coercive logic to believe them, we still should have to confess them to be destitute of all intelligible significance. Take God's aseity, for example; or his necessariness; his immateriality; his "simplicity" or superiority to the kind of inner variety and succession which we find in finite beings, his indivisibility, and lack of the inner distinctions of being and activity, substance and accident, potentiality and actuality, and the rest; his repudiation of inclusion in a genus; his actualized infinity; his "personality," apart from the moral qualities which it may comport; his relations to evil being permissive and not positive; his self-sufficiency, self-love, and absolute felicity in himself:--candidly speaking, how do such qualities as these make any definite connection with our life?  And if they severally call for no distinctive adaptations of our conduct, what vital difference can it possibly make to a man's religion whether they be true or false?

For my own part, although I dislike to say aught that may grate upon tender associations, I must frankly confess that even though these attributes were faultlessly deduced, I cannot conceive of its being of the smallest consequence to us religiously that any one of them should be true.  Pray, what specific act can I perform in order to adapt myself the better to God's simplicity?  Or how does it assist me to plan my behavior, to know that his happiness is anyhow absolutely complete?  In the middle of the century just past, Mayne Reid was the great writer of books of out-of-door adventure. He was forever extolling the hunters and field-observers of living animals' habits, and keeping up a fire of invective against the "closet-naturalists," as he called them, the collectors and classifiers, and handlers of skeletons and skins.  When I was a boy, I used to think that a closet- naturalist must be the vilest type of wretch under the sun. But surely the systematic theologians are the closet-naturalists of the deity, even in Captain Mayne Reid's sense.  What is their deduction of metaphysical attributes but a shuffling and matching of pedantic dictionary-adjectives, aloof from morals, aloof from human needs, something that might be worked out from the mere word "God" by one of those logical machines of wood and brass which recent ingenuity has contrived as well as by a man of flesh and blood.  They have the trail of the serpent over them.  One feels that in the theologians' hands, they are only a set of titles obtained by a mechanical manipulation of synonyms; verbality has stepped into the place of vision, professionalism into that of life.  Instead of bread we have a stone; instead of a fish, a serpent.  Did such a conglomeration of abstract terms give really the gist of our knowledge of the deity, schools of theology might indeed continue to flourish, but religion, vital religion, would have taken its flight from this world. What keeps religion going is something else than abstract definitions and systems of concatenated adjectives, and something different from faculties of theology and their professors.  All these things are after-effects, secondary accretions upon those phenomena of vital conversation with the unseen divine, of which I have shown you so many instances, renewing themselves in saecula saeculorum in the lives of humble private men.

So much for the metaphysical attributes of God!  From the point of view of practical religion, the metaphysical monster which they offer to our worship is an absolutely worthless invention of the scholarly mind.

What shall we now say of the attributes called moral? Pragmatically, they stand on an entirely different footing. They positively determine fear and hope and expectation, and are foundations for the saintly life.  It needs but a glance at them to show how great is their significance.

God's holiness, for example:  being holy, God can will nothing but the good.  Being omnipotent, he can secure its triumph.  Being omniscient, he can see us in the dark.  Being just, he can punish us for what he sees.  Being loving, he can pardon too.  Being unalterable, we can count on him securely.  These qualities enter into connection with our life, it is highly important that we should be informed concerning them.  That God's purpose in creation should be the manifestation of his glory is also an attribute which has definite relations to our practical life.  Among other things it has given a definite character to worship in all Christian countries.  If dogmatic theology really does prove beyond dispute that a God with characters like these exists, she may well claim to give a solid basis to religious sentiment.  But verily, how stands it with her arguments?

It stands with them as ill as with the arguments for his existence.  Not only do post-Kantian idealists reject them root and branch, but it is a plain historic fact that they never have converted any one who has found in the moral complexion of the world, as he experienced it, reasons for doubting that a good God can have framed it.  To prove God's goodness by the scholastic argument that there is no non-being in his essence would sound to such a witness simply silly.

No! the book of Job went over this whole matter once for all and definitively.  Ratiocination is a relatively superficial and unreal path to the deity:  "I will lay mine hand upon my mouth; I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth Thee."  An intellect perplexed and baffled, yet a trustful sense of presence--such is the situation of the man who is sincere with himself and with the facts, but who remains religious still.2

We must therefore, I think, bid a definitive good-by to dogmatic theology.  In all sincerity our faith must do without that warrant.  Modern idealism, I repeat, has said goodby to this theology forever.  Can modern idealism give faith a better warrant, or must she still rely on her poor self for witness?

The basis of modern idealism is Kant's doctrine of the Transcendental Ego of Apperception.  By this formidable term Kant merely meant the fact that the consciousness "I think them" must (potentially or actually) accompany all our objects.  Former skeptics had said as much, but the "I" in question had remained for them identified with the personal individual.  Kant abstracted and depersonalized it, and made it the most universal of all his categories, although for Kant himself the Transcendental Ego had no theological implications.

It was reserved for his successors to convert Kant's notion of Bewusstsein uberhaupt, or abstract consciousness, into an infinite concrete self-consciousness which is the soul of the world, and in which our sundry personal self-consciousnesses have their being.  It would lead me into technicalities to show you even briefly how this transformation was in point of fact effected.  Suffice it to say that in the Hegelian school, which to-day so deeply influences both British and American thinking, two principles have borne the brunt of the operation.

The first of these principles is that the old logic of identity never gives us more than a post-mortem dissection of disjecta membra, and that the fullness of life can be construed to thought only by recognizing that every object which our thought may propose to itself involves the notion of some other object which seems at first to negate the first one.

The second principle is that to be conscious of a negation is already virtually to be beyond it.  The mere asking of a question or expression of a dissatisfaction proves that the answer or the satisfaction is already imminent; the finite, realized as such, is already the infinite in posse.

Applying these principles, we seem to get a propulsive force into our logic which the ordinary logic of a bare, stark self-identity in each thing never attains to.  The objects of our thought now ACT within our thought, act as objects act when given in experience.  They change and develop. They introduce something other than themselves along with them; and this other, at first only ideal or potential, presently proves itself also to be actual.  It supersedes the thing at first supposed, and both verifies and corrects it, in developing the fullness of its meaning.

The program is excellent; the universe IS a place where things are followed by other things that both correct and fulfill them; and a logic which gave us something like this movement of fact would express truth far better than the traditional school-logic, which never gets of its own accord from anything to anything else, and registers only predictions and subsumptions, or static resemblances and differences. Nothing could be more unlike the methods of dogmatic theology than those of this new logic.  Let me quote in illustration some passages from the Scottish transcendentalist whom I have already named.

"How are we to conceive," Principal Caird writes, "of the reality in which all intelligence rests?"  He replies:  "Two things may without difficulty be proved, viz., that this reality is an absolute Spirit, and conversely that it is only in communion with this absolute Spirit or Intelligence that the finite Spirit can realize itself.  It is absolute; for the faintest movement of human intelligence would be arrested, if it did not presuppose the absolute reality of intelligence, of thought itself.  Doubt or denial themselves presuppose and indirectly affirm it.  When I pronounce anything to be true, I pronounce it, indeed, to be relative to thought, but not to be relative to my thought, or to the thought of any other individual mind.  From the existence of all individual minds as such I can abstract; I can think them away.  But that which I cannot think away is thought or self-consciousness itself, in its independence and absoluteness, or, in other words, an Absolute Thought or Self-Consciousness."

Here, you see, Principal Caird makes the transition which Kant did not make:  he converts the omnipresence of consciousness in general as a condition of "truth" being anywhere possible, into an omnipresent universal consciousness, which he identifies with God in his concreteness.  He next proceeds to use the principle that to acknowledge your limits is in essence to be beyond them; and makes the transition to the religious experience of individuals in the following words:

If [Man] were only a creature of transient sensations and impulses, of an ever coming and going succession of intuitions, fancies, feelings, then nothing could ever have for him the character of objective truth or reality.  But it is the prerogative of man's spiritual nature that he can yield himself up to a thought and will that are infinitely larger than his own.  As a thinking self-conscious being, indeed, he may be said, by his very nature, to live in the atmosphere of the Universal Life.

As a thinking being, it is possible for me to suppress and quell in my consciousness every movement of self-assertion, every notion and opinion that is merely mine, every desire that belongs to me as this particular Self, and to become the pure medium of a thought that is universal--in one word, to live no more my own life, but let my consciousness be possessed and suffused by the Infinite and Eternal life of spirit.  And yet it is just in this renunciation of self that I truly gain myself, or realize the highest possibilities of my own nature.  For whilst in one sense we give up self to live the universal and absolute life of reason, yet that to which we thus surrender ourselves is in reality our truer self.  The life of absolute reason is not a life that is foreign to us.

Nevertheless, Principal Caird goes on to say, so far as we are able outwardly to realize this doctrine, the balm it offers remains incomplete.  Whatever we may be in posse, the very best of us in actu falls very short of being absolutely divine. Social morality, love, and self-sacrifice even, merge our Self only in some other finite self or selves.  They do not quite identify it with the Infinite.  Man's ideal destiny, infinite in abstract logic, might thus seem in practice forever unrealizable.

"Is there, then," our author continues,

no solution of the contradiction between the ideal and the actual?  We answer, There is such a solution, but in order to reach it we are carried beyond the sphere of morality into that of religion.  It may be said to be the essential characteristic of religion as contrasted with morality, that it changes aspiration into fruition, anticipation into realization; that instead of leaving man in the interminable pursuit of a vanishing ideal, it makes him the actual partaker of a divine or infinite life.  Whether we view religion from the human side or the divine--as the surrender of the soul to God, or as the life of God in the soul--in either aspect it is of its very essence that the Infinite has ceased to be a far-off vision, and has become a present reality.  The very first pulsation of the spiritual life, when we rightly apprehend its significance, is the indication that the division between the Spirit and its object has vanished, that the ideal has become real, that the finite has reached its goal and become suffused with the presence and life of the Infinite.

Oneness of mind and will with the divine mind and will is not the future hope and aim of religion, but its very beginning and birth in the soul.  To enter on the religious life is to terminate the struggle.  In that act which constitutes the beginning of the religious life--call it faith, or trust, or self-surrender, or by whatever name you will--there is involved the identification of the finite with a life which is eternally realized.  It is true indeed that the religious life is progressive; but understood in the light of the foregoing idea, religious progress is not progress TOWARDS, but WITHIN the sphere of the Infinite.  It is not the vain attempt by endless finite additions or increments to become possessed of infinite wealth, but it is the endeavor, by the constant exercise of spiritual activity, to appropriate that infinite inheritance of which we are already in possession.  The whole future of the religious life is given in its beginning, but it is given implicitly.  The position of the man who has entered on the religious life is that evil, error, imperfection, do not really belong to him:  they are excrescences which have no organic relation to his true nature:  they are already virtually, as they will be actually, suppressed and annulled, and in the very process of being annulled they become the means of spiritual progress.  Though he is not exempt from temptation and conflict, [yet] in that inner sphere in which his true life lies, the struggle is over, the victory already achieved.  It is not a finite but an infinite life which the spirit lives.  Every pulse-beat of its [existence] is the expression and realization of the life of God.3

You will readily admit that no description of the phenomena of the religious consciousness could be better than these words of your lamented preacher and philosopher. They reproduce the very rapture of those crises of conversion of which we have been hearing; they utter what the mystic felt but was unable to communicate; and the saint, in hearing them, recognizes his own experience.  It is indeed gratifying to find the content of religion reported so unanimously.  But when all is said and done, has Principal Caird--and I only use him as an example of that whole mode of thinking--transcended the sphere of feeling and of the direct experience of the individual, and laid the foundations of religion in impartial reason?  Has he made religion universal by coercive reasoning, transformed it from a private faith into a public certainty?  Has he rescued its affirmations from obscurity and mystery?

I believe that he has done nothing of the kind, but that he has simply reaffirmed the individual's experiences in a more generalized vocabulary.  And again, I can be excused from proving technically that the transcendentalist reasonings fail to make religion universal, for I can point to the plain fact that a majority of scholars, even religiously disposed ones, stubbornly refuse to treat them as convincing.  The whole of Germany, one may say, has positively rejected the Hegelian argumentation.  As for Scotland, I need only mention Professor Fraser's and Professor Pringle-Pattison's memorable criticisms, with which so many of you are familiar.4  Once more, I ask, if transcendental idealism were as objectively and absolutely rational as it pretends to be, could it possibly fail so egregiously to be persuasive?

The most persuasive arguments in favor of a concrete individual Soul of the world, with which I am acquainted, are those of my colleague, Josiah Royce, in his Religious Aspect of Philosophy, Boston, 1885; in his Conception of God, New York and London, 1897; and lately in his Aberdeen Gifford Lectures, The World and the Individual, 2 vols., New York and London, 1901-02.  I doubtless seem to some of my readers to evade the philosophic duty which my thesis in this lecture imposes on me, by not even attempting to meet Professor Royce's arguments articulately.  I admit the momentary evasion.  In the present lectures, which are cast throughout in a popular mould, there seemed no room for subtle metaphysical discussion, and for tactical purposes it was sufficient the contention of philosophy being what it is (namely, that religion can be transformed into a universally convincing science), to point to the fact that no religious philosophy has actually convinced the mass of thinkers.  Meanwhile let me say that I hope that the present volume may be followed by another, if I am spared to write it, in which not only Professor Royce's arguments, but others for monistic absolutism shall be considered with all the technical fullness which their great importance calls for.  At present I resign myself to lying passive under the reproach of superficiality.

What religion reports, you must remember, always purports to be a fact of experience:  the divine is actually present, religion says, and between it and ourselves relations of give and take are actual.  If definite perceptions of fact like this cannot stand upon their own feet, surely abstract reasoning cannot give them the support they are in need of.  Conceptual processes can class facts, define them, interpret them; but they do not produce them, nor can they reproduce their individuality.  There is always a PLUS, a THISNESS, which feeling alone can answer for.  Philosophy in this sphere is thus a secondary function, unable to warrant faith's veracity, and so I revert to the thesis which I announced at the beginning of this lecture.

In all sad sincerity I think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experience is absolutely hopeless.

It would be unfair to philosophy, however, to leave her under this negative sentence.  Let me close, then, by briefly enumerating what she CAN do for religion.  If she will abandon metaphysics and deduction for criticism and induction, and frankly transform herself from theology into science of religions, she can make herself enormously useful.

The spontaneous intellect of man always defines the divine which it feels in ways that harmonize with its temporary intellectual prepossessions.  Philosophy can by comparison eliminate the local and the accidental from these definitions.  Both from dogma and from worship she can remove historic incrustations.  By confronting the spontaneous religious constructions with the results of natural science, philosophy can also eliminate doctrines that are now known to be scientifically absurd or incongruous.   Sifting out in this way unworthy formulations, she can leave a residuum of conceptions that at least are possible. With these she can deal as HYPOTHESES, testing them in all the manners, whether negative or positive, by which hypotheses are ever tested.  She can reduce their number, as some are found more open to objection.  She can perhaps become the champion of one which she picks out as being the most closely verified or verifiable.  She can refine upon the definition of this hypothesis, distinguishing between what is innocent over-belief and symbolism in the expression of it, and what is to be literally taken.  As a result, she can offer mediation between different believers, and help to bring about consensus of opinion.  She can do this the more successfully, the better she discriminates the common and essential from the individual and local elements of the religious beliefs which she compares.

I do not see why a critical Science of Religions of this sort might not eventually command as general a public adhesion as is commanded by a physical science.  Even the personally non-religious might accept its conclusions on trust, much as blind persons now accept the facts of optics--it might appear as foolish to refuse them.  Yet as the science of optics has to be fed in the first instance, and continually verified later, by facts experienced by seeing persons; so the science of religions would depend for its original material on facts of personal experience, and would have to square itself with personal experience through all its critical reconstructions.  It could never get away from concrete life, or work in a conceptual vacuum.  It would forever have to confess, as every science confesses, that the subtlety of nature flies beyond it, and that its formulas are but approximations. Philosophy lives in words, but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that exceed verbal formulation.  There is in the living act of perception always something that glimmers and twinkles and will not be caught, and for which reflection comes too late.  No one knows this as well as the philosopher.  He must fire his volley of new vocables out of his conceptual shotgun, for his profession condemns him to this industry, but he secretly knows the hollowness and irrelevancy. His formulas are like stereoscopic or kinetoscopic photographs seen outside the instrument; they lack the depth, the motion, the vitality.  In the religious sphere, in particular, belief that formulas are true can never wholly take the place of personal experience.

In my next lecture I will try to complete my rough description of religious experience; and in the lecture after that, which is the last one, I will try my hand at formulating conceptually the truth to which it is a witness.



1. In an article, How to make our Ideas Clear, in the Popular Science Monthly for January, 1878, vol. xii. p. 286.

2. Pragmatically, the most important attribute of God is his punitive justice.  But who, in the present state of theological opinion on that point, will dare maintain that hell fire or its equivalent in some shape is rendered certain by pure logic?  Theology herself has largely based this doctrine upon revelation, and, in discussing it, has tended more and more to substitute conventional ideas of criminal law for a priori principles of reason.  But the very notion that this glorious universe, with planets and winds, and laughing sky and ocean, should have been conceived and had its beams and rafters laid in technicalities of criminality, is incredible to our modern imagination.  It weakens a religion to hear it argued upon such a basis.

3. John Caird:  An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion London and New York, 1880, pp. 243-250, and 291-299, much abridged.

4. A. C. Fraser:  Philosophy of Theism, second edition, Edinburgh and London, 1899, especially part ii, chaps. vii. and viii.  A. Seth [Pringle-Pattison]:  Hegelianism and Personality, Ibid., 1890, passim.

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