The Global Spiral  is an e-publication of Metanexus Institute. Through articles, essays, book reviews, and news, the Global Spiral  explores humanity's most profound questions and challenges.
Email



If you enjoy this article, consider making an online donation to support the Global Spiral.

View / Add Comments ( 5 ) | Printer-Friendly | Email This Article


How to go to Heaven or How the Heavens go? Part 1 of 2

Metanexus Sophia. 2004_02_17. 5939 Words

Below is part one of a two-part essay by Dhruv Raina from the Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India. Raina compares two pious scientists, the renowned English Sinologis= t Joseph Needham and the Pakistani physicist Abdus Salaam, in order to unrave= l the complex relationships between science, religion, and social context. I= n part one, Raina introduces his study and discusses Needham, a pious English Christian and Marxist, who devoted his life to the study of the Chinese scientific traditions.

The essay was presented at International Seminar on Modern Science, Values and the Quest for Unity, held last month in Mahabaleshwar, India.

-- Editor

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
How to go to Heaven or How the Heavens go? Contemporary Perspectives on a Galilean Dilemma (1)

Dhruv Raina, Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies School of Social Sciences Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi 110067 India

Sometimes I frequent the Christian cloister and sometimes the mosque, But it is thou whom I search for from temple to temple. Thine elect have no dealings with heresy or orthodoxy; For neither of these stands behind the screen of thy truth. Speculation to the heretic, theology to the orthodox But the dust of the rose-petal belongs to the heart of the perfume-seller. Ab_'l Fazl `All_mi, quoted in [Needham, 1979, p.210]

A recent popular biography of Leonardo Da Vinci by Michael White in passing raises an important issue concerning the supposed conflict between the quests for scientific and religious truths. White is surprised to observe that Leonardo lived during a period of intense religious persecution in Europe and yet in his notebooks there is singularly no mention of the divine. Would it be reasonable to conclude that Leonardo had "no use for a traditional deity". Modern scientists, at a distance from that historical juncture, may have been able to reconcile the two, but for Leonardo "... a man who had little respect for humanity but boundless respect for the beaut= y of the body and the place of humankind in the greater structure of pantheis= t vision, there simply could be no personal god" [White, 2000, p.333]. Conceptual frames developed by scientists or historians of science on the one hand and representations lodged in the popular imagination are closely imbricated and structured by a schism whose origins are traced back to the beginning of a process of secularization of science that commenced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries [Bentley, 1997; Jacob, 1988; Crombie, 1994; Porter, 2000; Fuller, 1997a].

Another work of a historical-literary genre, Samarkand by Amin Malouf takes us into the socio-political world of Omar Khayyam and the golden age of Arabic/Islamic science. The portrait we have of the working of the polymath mind of Omar Khayyam is again deeply suggestive of a very contemporary understanding of the distinctive methods and goals of the scientific and religious quests [Malouf, 1992]. However, scholars have pointed out how pre-Galilean science was enveloped within a sacred cosmos, and the secularization of science marks a departure from "scientia sacra" [Koyre, 1958]. In the elaboration that follows, I shall discuss the quests of two twentieth century scientists, Joseph Needham and Abdus Salaam in order to explore two contemporary perspectives on science and religion.

The exploration can be pursued from a number of perspectives. I shall however restrict the questions asked to the social studies of science without pursuing the deeper concerns of theology proper. However, at the very outset, it must be specified that while unraveling the complex world within which these perspectives are anchored, I do not privilege either of them or value one over the other. The choice of scientists is determined by their vocations as pious scientists and the circumstance that they came fro= m quite distinct cultural and political backgrounds, and though they spent a good part of their lives at Cambridge University their trajectories may or may not have intersected.

Science and religion: A Veritable War Zone?

We begin by asking how is the relationship between science and religion conceived? Do we accept the standard picture that portrays these as two contradictory, oppositional, conflictual pursuits? (2) Is there an immanent tension between them or is the conceptualization of this relationship conditioned by the changing role and function of science and religion in historical time. In order to comprehend this relationship necessitates, among other things, investigating the models scientists have developed abou= t the natural world they analyze and the symbolic world in which human beings have found both meaning and purpose in life. (3) Consequently, it may be suggested that this relationship itself evolves and is in consonance with the interests they serve within society. Just as we cannot discuss the method of science in the ever-present tense [Fuller, 1997], it is not meaningful or rewarding to conceptualize science and religion as historically unchanging. Taking a historical perspective, Hedley Brooke ha= s suggested that there are three historically contingent models of the relationship between scientific and religious movements serving different social, political and religious ends [Brooke, 1996, p.764].

The three models or broad historical patterns that Brooke has identified ar= e those of isolation, integration and conflict. The integration model is encountered in societies where an emergent scientific community is seeking reconciliation with powerful religious interests, or where religious interests attempt to redefine themselves in the light of scientific reason or protect themselves from perceived external threats. The protective strategy is also evident in the isolation model, inasmuch as it postulates =
a separation of the two realms of science and religion. Further this is a marker of the separation of professional science from that of academic theology. The conflict model appears in sharp focus, according to Brooke whenever the scientific community seeks to consolidate new scientific developments or professional changes and in the process excludes the religious community, or when the religious community feels frightfully threatened by these developments [Brooke, 1996, p.764]. These broad pattern= s or models themselves emerged out of the Western European historical experience over the last three hundred years.

These broad patterns would overlap in cultural zones distant from the Western European cultural experience; and in such a situations not only would they overlap but would the patterns would exhibit some degree of interfoliation. It could even be suggested that this may be equally true of the European or Western experience as well. The antagonism of the French savants towards the clergy during the decades preceding the French revolution of 1789 and for a couple of decades following it appears to have become emblematic of the relationship between science and religion. The picture in England was however not so clearly defined till the controversy over Darwinian evolution in the late nineteenth century. Consequently, it could be suggested that the power of the conflict model derives from three important historical developments in the history of sciences. The first of these relates to the origin myths that paint Bruno and Galileo as victims o= f religious fury and martyrs in the cause of modern science [Redondi, 1989; Lerner and Gosselin, 1975; Weingart, 1993]. The interesting feature here is that religion is presented as one of the several forces that compromise the search for scientific truth. As the morality tale has it, in the end the truth of science prevails over the forces that seek to suppress its autonom= y and corrupt this enterprise of truth. The second development that becomes more relevant in the nineteenth century is the recognition of a process tha= t commences in Galileo's physics but relates to the secularization of scientific knowledge and sees its culmination in the birth of evolutionary biology and synthetic organic chemistry. And finally, we have the trope of Baconian optimism that science will usher in the millennium. This feature i= s common to all policy discourses and was already present in the Voltairean promise of science as opposed to religious pursuit. But as Brooke rightly points out, the inadequacy of this model that is premised on the agonistic contest of two "competing mentalities" is evident when we confront men and women of the cloth pursuing science or when the cause of science is pursued by pious scientists [Brooke, 1996, p.765]. In any case, the proposition tha= t scientific and religious interests are frequently locked in a pitched battl= e is rooted in the Western historical experience. Histories of science in non-Western cultural areas frequently ascribe the non-emergence of modern science in these regions as a consequence of the over-bearing presence of religious interests that have stifled the scientific march towards truth [Sayili, 1960; Huff, 1993; Chattopadhyaya, 1959, 1976, 1986].

My purpose here is not to refute or validate this central premise that defines the relationship between science and religion, though I may be personally disposed to it in some weak form for purely historical reasons. However, I would like to elaborate upon its inadequacy by peeping into the religious world of two contemporary scientists. In doing so, I shall argue that the boundary between the models of isolation and integration are very fuzzy as we traverse across cultures and contexts.

Needham: The contemporary dialectic of science and religion

In the discussion on Needham that follows, I shall not attempt to plot a chronological line of the evolution of Needham's thought but take up themes that have been with him through his life. Very early in his career, when h= e was a leading embryologist and before he was to turn to the study of scienc= e and civilization of China, Needham was already writing on matters of science, religion and politics. This itself suggests that in order to make sense of the science-religion dyad it may have been necessary to factor in =
a third entity the modern nation state. In which case, we have the triad science-religion-politics. In a piece entitled "Religion in a world dominated by Science" [Needham, 1976, pp. 56-81], from the 1930s Needham wa= s to write in terms we consider paradigmatic of the history of modern science= :
"No opposition has been more violent and long continued in the past than that between the organized apprehension of the world's ultimate mystery, which we call religion, and the organized investigation of the world's apparent mechanism, which we call science" [Needham, 1976, p. 56].

Science and religion were then two isolated quests separated by two modes o= f knowing different worlds. Which we can schematize below:

Science >> Method = Organized investigation Objective = To comprehend the world's apparent mechanism

Religion >> Method = Organized apprehension Objective = To explain the world's ultimate mystery

In this separation of science and religion Needham sees that the space commanded by science begins to encroach upon that engulfed by religion. Thi= s constituted the crux of the challenge for religion. As the domain of scienc= e expanded it compressed the world of the numinous into a corner: "We live in a world dominated by scientific thought, or rather ...by a popular version of the state of mind natural to the scientific thinker" [Needham, 1976, p.57]. From the perspective of a very contemporaneous debate it is interesting to remark that this essay was written, read and published in England, which was still distant from the concerns of the "public understanding of science" (4). And yet while that world could be considere= d scientific, Needham wondered whether the gravity of that remark had actuall= y been apprehended. The true connotation of referring to the age as scientifi= c resided in the 'extraordinary power', acquired over natural processes by human beings. The acquisition of power had deracinated human beings from th= e earth and insulated them by layers of steel and glass. The challenge that religion faced from science came from at least four quarters.

[1] Millenarianism weakens the mystical appeal to nature

Like his colleague and Marxist comrade at Cambridge, Des Bernal, Needham wa= s very farsighted in anticipating the ethical consequences of future developments in the area of biological engineering. A logical consequence o= f this accumulation of power would further hasten the process whereby the tie= s between man and nature were severed. Writing in 1930: "an instance which concerns me particularly as a biologist... we are as yet only at the very threshold of undreamed of control over living things, including ourselves..." [Needham, 1976, p. 59]. This prompted an opposition between theology and science and begged the question from science: having acquired this power over nature how was it to be deployed? Where would the rules tha= t guide its application come from? This impulse to harness and control nature sustains the millenarianism of science and the concomitant erosion of "mystical attitude towards the problem of evil". The tension between science and religion is translated into the tension between millenarianism and mysticism - though according to Needham these forms of experience are mirror images of each other. The ideological positioning of science in communism is derived from this millenarianism that eschewed mystery.

[2] Abstraction weakens the attention to the individual

The second source of antagonism between these two approaches arises from th= e principle of abstraction as it operates in science. The principle of abstraction involves the processes of classification and indexing of individual entities or cases into classes and once these classes are create= d the individual instance is forgotten. In the language of science, once an individual instance is fitted into the curve and an equation set up the individual instances no longer matter [Needham, 1976, p.61-2]. Needham observed that the influence of scientific abstraction on daily life would only increase with time and travestied an essential perspective of the religious spirit: "...the interference of science with the course of Nature weakens the appeal of the mystical attitude towards life, so the habit of abstraction common to all scientific procedure weakens that attention to th= e individual and unique which always was and probably always will be an essential part of religion" [Needham, 1976, p.63].

[3] Science breeds a lack of reverence for the superhuman

The third challenge that the practice of science poses for religion arises from the ethical neutrality of the practicing "scientific worker". This neutrality is for Needham Janus-faced. It is a virtue inasmuch as the scientific worker must not be deterred by the subject matter of investigation. This detachment with respect to the subject matter is in his words "an extremely noble thing" that he or she must strive to attain. But what this produces is a "spring-cleaned, swept and garnished" room free to be occupied by other demons, such as those of war and pestilence [Needham, 1976, p. 64]. Thus the scientific worker's ethical neutrality compromises traditional morality. The dominant positioning of science in society gives rise to an "experimental morality" that compounds the problems for organize= d religion [Needham, 1976, p.65-6].

In pointing this out Needham does differentiate between the problems posed for ethics in the contemporary world from those of the past. Thus early Greek science was not an experimental science the way modern science is, bu= t was based on "speculations of a scientific character concerning natural things". These speculations were recommended since they released human beings from divinities depicted in the representations of the motions of th= e stars and planets. However, the constant feature was that the even in this early period of Greek history science and religion belonged to separate domains. Nevertheless, the Stoic Epicurus would remark that by reflecting "on the natural construction of the world" a certain peace of mind could be attained [Needham, 1976, p. 70]. The Epicurean standpoint was quite at variance with the religious one since it did not entertain any awe towards superhuman power as Neoplatonism did. And without awe the sense of the religious was absent. If the prehistory of science and techniques was already marked by an erosion of reverence, how much more difficult would it be to sustain it in today's world to continue [Needham, 1976, p.70-71]. Thu= s while science and religion are not opposed to each other, the very origins of science are characterized by a loss of the sense of mystery or reverence for a superhuman power that governs the world from behind the curtains.

[4] Scientific worker as the new priest

The idea is taken up in another essay entitled "Science, Religion and Socialism" [Needham, 1976, pp. 233-264] that was first written in 1935 and rewritten several years later. Here Needham takes up the religious crisis o= f the contemporary scientific worker who has risen to a semi-oracular tripod. The ascent of the scientific worker to the position of a "religious thinker= "
or Pythagorean priest has been the outcome of the acquisition of greater power over nature [Needham, 1976, p.234]. The inability of Christian man to transform human society into the kingdom of god on earth manifests itsel= f in the ancient separation of the secular and the sacred. In the modern age this continued failure when measured against the gradual advance of science shifted the source of legitimacy from religion or the monarchy (legitimacy of the monarchy as ordained by divinity) to science [Weingart, 1993]. Science became the new source of legitimacy and scientific worker the new ascetic or monk [Needham, 1976, p.234].

Marxian Utopia and the Kingdom of God

Needham then proceeds to examine the relationship between the Christian ide= a of the kingdom of God and its secular correlate in ideas of Utopia. The exploration of this relationship leads him to conclude that we have here an insight into the relationship between Christianity and communism. In Christian thought the Kingdom of God takes on the following logical forms:

* as here and now * as here but not yet * as not here but now already * as not here and not yet [Needham 1976, p.241].

These visions of the Kingdom of God were in circulation at different historical moments in the history of Christianity. The idea of the Kingdom of God as the here but not yet prevailed during the early history of the church (4th century A.D) and was reflected in the doctrine of millenarianis= m and the imminent belief in the second coming of the Lord. In his reflection= s on Utopian thought Marc Bloch would reason that the distinction between the "authentic" and inauthentic" Utopia was that the authentic Utopia was the not-yet, while the inauthentic Utopia was the Utopia that was here but at some geographical distance [Nowotony, 1984]. The Neo-Platonists, closely associated with the scientific renaissance, conversely emphasized that the Kingdom was a mystical idea that existed now but inhabited the realm of the spirit (a here but an elsewhere). It was during the reign of Constantine that the Kingdom of God was identified with an actually existing society -
the Kingdom of God was here and now - the Eastern empire or the Latin Churc= h [Needham, 1976, pp. 241-2]. These different representations of the Kingdom of God either as alterity (as other than here), radical alterity (as elsewhere), as similitude (as other that is here) or as exemplar as in a Utopia [Murr, 1986, p.15-21] have secular correlates in the enlightenment discourse. Needham was searching the connection between his version of communism and Christianity since his quest is for a "moral theology for today".=20

This moral theology he found in communism that provided a vision of a bette= r society setting out that the exploitation of man, of waging war for markets= , of the unequal distribution of goods, education and leisure were all immoral. In other words for him it continued the historical work of Christianity. The task before the scientific worker is to establish that th= e ethics of collectivism arose from the understanding of the world around us. In other words, Needham was now enriching the moral universe by the scientific understanding of it. In his understanding then corresponding to the different orders of human social organization that evolved through certain natural processes were appropriate ethical forms [Needham, 1976, pp. 245-246]. The determination to build the kingdom of God on earth is reflected, Needham argues in all "forms of socialism and communism"; and that "theological religion ... will settle accounts with them in due course= "
[Needham, 1979, p.210]. Putting it schematically:

Human social organization << >> Ethical Forms Feudal society << >> Catholic ethics Capitalist society << >> Protestant ethics Communist society << >> Scientific ethics

The rationale for Needham's comparative method

I would like here to depart in a minor way not so much from Needham's reflection on the relationship between science and religion but his exploration of the same problematic in other cultures. For one of the crucial elements in Needham's thinking was his comparative historiography [Cohen, 1994; Goldsmith, 1995; Blue, 1999]. Evident from the previous discussion is the inference that Needham's optic is situated squarely withi= n a Christian historiography and one particularly anchored in the European historical experience. However, like several of his comrades at Cambridge, namely Bernal and Haldane, Needham turned eastward in search of new ways of thinking through the crisis of Western capitalist civilization that had become especially acute during the 1930s [Werskey, 1978]. It could be retrospectively conjectured, as several others have done, that Needham's dialogue with the Eastern civilizations provided him the opening for thinking through the assumptions of Western civilization and social science theory. His "Science and Civilization in China" [Needham, 1954-] is a monumental opus within the canons of Western scholarship [Blue, 1999; Raina= , 2003].=20

In attempting to grapple with the crisis of European civilization construed as a political-economic one as much as a moral one, Needham sought to integrate or reconcile the morality of religion or communism with his science. Reckoning with the problematic nature of this integration or reconciliation Needham probably hoped that the comparative perspective or a dialogue with the Other would illuminate the antinomies of contemporary Western culture and provide alternate starting points where the antinomies would no longer remain antinomies. In his collected writings we encounter innumerable sermons that discursively navigate through the problematic of science and religion [Visvanathan, 1999], but I would like to discuss a lecture and a sermon that take up the question of science, religion and the East Asian cultures that were published in the fascinating collection that goes by the title "Within the Four Seas: The Dialogue of East and West" [Needham, 1979].=20

Science purifies religion and does not liquidate it

The Cambridge Union Society had organized a debate on 9 May, 1961 around th= e proposition "Where Science advances Religion Recedes". The proposers of the motion had argued that as "mankind succeeds in penetrating the secrets of nature, naive religious beliefs must succumb; the doctrinal certainties of the past are transmuted into a corpus of legend" [Needham, 1979, p.189]. Needham however took a different tack on the motion and argued instead that the advance of science lead to the "purification of religious philosophy an= d to new interpretations of theology". It was popular religious folklore that would disappear [Needham, 1979, p.189]. The ocular centric vision of the Enlightenment was revealing a very different perspective on religion. The light of science would not consume religion but would purify it of religion's populist side and draw it to the empyrean heights of religious philosophy. Clearly Needham's understanding of the relationship between science and religion had changed between the 1930s and 1960. If in the 1930= s he saw the ideology of science encroaching steadily upon the different aspects of human experience, in the 1960s he saw science not so much as liquidating religion but of purifying it.

The idea of a non-particularistic religion, where rites and reason do not conflict

This conversion was in part produced by his encounter with the science and religion problematic in other cultures. This encounter with other cultures revised his definition of religion as going beyond just the sense of the numinous by being attached in its most developed forms "to the highest ethical principles known to man". These ethical principles included the imperative to altogether transcend particular manifestations of "our parochial and limited experience" 5[Needham, 1979, p. 189]. In which case scientific advances could enable the invention of new non-particularistic o= r non-denominational forms of religious community. It could be conjectured here that there were two senses of internationalism that formed a sort of template for his new vision of community. There was his Marxist inspired internationalism of the working class and the international ethos of scienc= e that guided the "scientific worker" the world over.

In order to acquire this perspective of religion Needham sets out what religion has meant in different regions of the world and not just in fragments of "medieval Latin theology garbled into English and popularly misconceived" [Needham, 1979, p. 190]. A more extensive understanding of th= e religious universal impulse would come from entering into a dialogue with the civilizations of the East and Needham spent a good five decades of his life attempting to understand the science and civilisation of China. The exploration of Confucianism led him to infer that religious thinking was no= t necessarily underpinned by the doctrine of a creator. Quoting the this-worldly ethic of Confucius: "You do not yet know how to serve your fellow-men; how should I teach you how to serve spirits". Needham probably found that the idea resonated with his own Marxism and this engagement with Confucian reversed his conception of religion, by putting his fellow-beings before God (6). Confucianism thus provided him the lever to prise open the assumptions of science and Christianity. The co-existence of materialism an= d reason with rite and liturgy within Confucianism challenged the dualisms on which Western modernity was premised.

Religion: the application of the numinous to the highest ethical values

Similarly Chinese Buddhist theology was hardly insistent on a supreme deity= , a priesthood or claim to infallibility. Ethical insight and the numinous were bound together in a theory of salvation that could only be achieved through self-restraint, self-control and self-sacrifice. Though this salvation is personal it is also the clue to "human solidarity and social order". The advance of science could at best challenge the mythological belief or the belief of reincarnation. But the technology of the self that would emancipate the self through the practice of compassion would remain [Needham, 1979, p. 194]. For Needham then, as would be the point being laboured between the lines, religion was "the sense of the numinous applied to the highest ethical values" [Needham, 1979, p. 194]. This conception of religion provides us the clue to the relationship between science, religion and Marxism in Needham's thought seen as motivated by a theory of action guided by the highest ethical values. For it was only in a socialist society, his age of communists believed that, would science be used for "human benefit rather than human destruction". The real meaning of democracy would derive from the likely application of science as a common good; since the boundary between the pursuit of science for its own sake an= d science for profit were often blurred [Needham, 1979, p.195].

This vision of science would come with a word of caution. For the Marxist, religious opium was to be oblivious of "class oppression" but Needham alerted his readership to "scientific hashish" as well. Scientific hashish was the cloak of neutrality that scientists wore and that exonerated them o= f the responsibility of the consequences of their scientific researches. Charging his mathematical physicist and experimental biologist colleagues for refusing to make political judgements, or ignoring the social applications and consequences of their discoveries - the scientist is in danger of becoming the "hashishin" [Needham, 1979, p 196]. Needham's religious credo is then that of a scientist at a time when science becomes the most dominant source of legitimacy.

The dialectic of science and religion

This is not to say that Needham denied the tormentous relation between the two. The paradox for Needham was that the region of the world where modern science blossomed was also the region that produced an "indefensible theology". Further east, idealist and subjectivist attitudes played up anti-scientific attitudes in India (7). This was never the case in China, o= r so Needham contends [Needham, 1979, p. 198]. The author of this paper is no= t aware how contemporary and subsequent generations of Chinese historians of science responded to this perspective of Needham. However, this excursion leads him to plead for the "mutual understanding of the great civilizations by each other". This was his supremely ethical cause celebre.

In concluding this discussion on Needham, it may be said that Needham was i= n search of a new definition of religion consistent with his science and politics. His journey into Chinese science and civilization provided him a comparative perspective from which to distance himself and think through th= e antinomies of Western culture. This thinking through was important during the years when the ideology of an ever-powerful science swept through the scientific community and had anchored itself within the public at large. Having lived through two world wars and the looming threat of nuclear war; the revolutions of biotechnology just around the corner; Needham and member= s of the Cambridge left were for looking for ways to ethically guide science and protect it from the profit motive ideology of capitalism that controlle= d science. For Needham a new conception of religion enriched by the light of science would show the way: "All superstition will be swept away, all false theology will disappear, but the holiness of mercy, pity, peace and love will remain. Indeed they and they alone will be able to save science from the utter disasters which otherwise the misuse of it will bring upon mankind" [Needham, 1979, p.199]. The relationship between science and religion was a dialectical one, for science would purify religion of the accretions of the centuries, while religion would guide science through the application of the numinous redefined to the highest ethical values.

Part One of Two, Continued

1 Paper presented at the International Seminar on Modern Science, Values an= d the Quest for Unity, January 2nd -6th, 2004, Mahabaleshwar. I thank the participants at the conference for their valuable comments, some of which have been incorporated. The usual disclaimer applies.

2 Some historians of science often take the conflictual view as paradigmati= c or axiomatic of the relationship between science and religion. In the words of Draper, the history of science "is a narrative of the conflict between two contending powers, the expansive force of the human intellect on the on= e side, and the compression arising from faith and human interests in the other" [quoted in Brooke, 1996, p.765].

3 The social studies of science has for sometime now been acquainted with theories that are anchored in the idea of the co-production of natural and social order. One could risk suggesting that there could as well be an analogy between the co-evolution of the natural and religious order.

4 For an interesting review of the subject see [Wyne,1994]. 5 In a sermon he delivered at Gonville and Caius College in the same year h= e emphasised the need to "cultivate friends of other civilizations, and to learn to respond to the numinous in their great traditions" [Needham, 1979, p.208].

6 He accused Westerners of being enslaved to the idea of religious and cultural supremacy when presented with the great civilizations of Asia - at the time he was specifically reacting to Koestler who was expatiating on th= e shortcomings of the Indian and Japanese religions. Needham responds with Christian humility: "he that despiseth Man, despiseth not Man but God" [Needham, 1979, p.203].

7 The influence of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Needham's interlocutor for matters pertaining to ancient India, is seen here.

REFERENCES

Adas, Michael. 1990. Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Baber, Zaheer,. 1996. The Science of Empire: Scientific Knowledge, Civilization and Colonial Rule in India, New York: State University Press.

Barrow, John D. and Tipler, Frank J. 1988. The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York.

Bentley, Michael. 1997. "Introduction: Approaches to Modernity: Western Historiography since the Enlightenment", in Michael Bentley (Ed.), Companio= n to Historiography, Routledge: London and New York, pp. 395-506.

Blue, Gregory. 1999. "Science(s), Civilization(s), Historie(s): A Continuin= g Dialogue with Joseph Needham, in S.Irfan Habib and Dhruv Raina (Eds.), Situating the History of Sciences: Dialogues with Joseph Needham, Oxford University Press, pp. 29-72.

Brooke, John Hedley, 1996. "Science and Religion", in R.C.Colby, G.N.Cantor= , J.R.R.Christie and M.J.S.Hodge (Eds.), Companion to the History of Modern Science. Routledge, pp. 763-782.

Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. 1959. Lokayata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism, PPH, New Delhi.

* 1976. What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy, PPH, New Delhi.

* 1986. History of Science and Technology in Ancient India: The Beginnings, Firma KLM Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta.

Cohen, H.Floris. 1994. The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry. University of Chicago Press.

Crombie, A.C. 1994. Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition : The History of Argument and Explanation especially in the Mathematical and Biomedical Sciences and Arts, Duckworth.

Elzinga, Aant. 1999. "UNESCO and the Politics of Scientific Internationalism", in Aant Elzinga and Catharina Landstr=EEm (Eds.), Internationalism and Science. Taylor Graham: pp. 89-131.

Fuller, Steve. 1997. Science. Open University Press, Buckingham.

Fuller, Steve. 1997a. "The Secularization of Science and a New Deal for Science Policy", Futures, 29, 6, pp. 483-503.

Goldsmith, Maurice. 1995. Joseph Needham: 20th-Century Renaissance Man. UNESCO Publishing.=20

Gosling, David. 1976. Science and Religion in India. Madras.

Habib, S. Irfan. and Raina, Dhruv.1989. "Copernicus, Columbus, Colonialism and the role of science in Nineteenth Century India", Social Scientist, 190-191, pp. 51-66

Hawking, Stephen. 1988. A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes. Bantam Press.

Huff, Toby. E. 1993. The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China and the West. Cambridge University Press.

Jacob, Margaret. 1988. The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution, New York: Alfred A.Knopf.

Koyr=C7, Alexandre. 1958. Metaphysics and Measurements, London

Lai, C.H. and Kidwai, Azim (Eds.). 1989. Ideals and Realities: Selected Essays of Abdus Salam. World Scientific Publishing Co. Ltd.

Lerner, L. and Gosselin, E. 1975. " Galileo and the Long Shadow of Bruno", Arch. Intnl. d'Hist. des Sciences, XXV, 97, pp. 223-246.

Malouf, Amin. 1992. Samarkand. Quartet Books.

Murr, Sylvia. 1986. "Les J=C7suites et l'Inde au XVIIIe si(cle: Praxis, utopie, pr(anthropologie", Revue de l'Universit( d'Ottawa, 56, 1, 1986, pp. 9-27.

Needham, Joseph. 1954-. Science and Civilization in China. 7 vols. Cambridg= e University Press.

* 1973. "The Historian of Science as Ecumenical Man: A Meditation in the Shingon Temple of Kongosammai-in on Koysan", in Shigeru Nakayama and Nathan Sivin (Eds.), Chinese Science: Exploration of an Ancient Tradition, MIT Press, pp. 1-8.

* 1976. Moulds of Understanding: A Pattern of Natural Philosophy. George Allen & Unwin: London.

* 1979. Within the Four Seas: The Dialogue of East and West. George Allen &
Unwin: London.

Nowotny, Helga. 1984. "Science and Utopia: On the Social Ordering of the Future", in Everett Mendelsohn and Helga Nowotony (Eds.), Nineteen Eighty-Four: Science between Utopia and Dystopia. Sociology of Sciences, Volume VIII. D.Reidel Publishing Company, pp.3-18.

Petitjean, Patrick. 1999. "Needham, Anglo-French Civilities and Ecumenical Science" in S.Irfan Habib and Dhruv Raina (Eds.), Situating the History of Sciences: Dialogues with Joseph Needham, Oxford University Press, pp. 152-197.

Porter, Roy. 2000. Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World. Penguin Books.

Raina, Dhruv. 2003. Images and Contexts: The Historiography of Science and Modernity in India. Oxford University Press: Delhi.

Raina, Dhruv and Habib, S.Irfan. 1996. "The moral legitimation of modern science: Bhadralok reflections on theories of evolution", Social Studies of Science, 26, No. 1, pp. 9-42.

Redondi, Pietro. 1989. Galileo Heretic. Trans by Raymond Rosenthal. Princeton University Press.

Sayili, Aydin. 1960. The Observatory in Islam. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Series 7, no. 38.

Singh, Jagjit. 1992. Abdus Salam: A Biography. Penguin Books India.

Visvanathan, Shiv. 1999. "The Strange Quest of Joseph Needham", in S.Irfan Habib and Dhruv Raina (Eds.), Situating the History of Sciences: Dialogues with Joseph Needham, Oxford University Press, pp. 198 - 219.

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
This discussion list, SOPHIA, is hosted by Metanexus Online . The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of Metanexus or its sponsors.

Metanexus welcomes submissions between 1000 to 3000 words of essays and book reviews that seek to explore and interpret science and religion in original and insightful ways for a general educated audience. Previous columns give a good indication of the topical range and tone for acceptable essays. Please send all inquiries and submissions to editor@metanexus.net. Metanexus consists of a number of topically focused forums (Anthropos, Bios, Cogito, Cosmos, Salus, Sophia, and Techne) and periodic HTML enriched composite digests from each of the lists.

Copyright notice: Except when otherwise noted, articles may be forwarded, quoted, or republished in full with attribution to the author of the column and "Metanexus: The Online Forum on Religion and Science". Republication for commercial purposes in print or electronic format requires the permission of the author. Copyright 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 by Metanexus Institute.

To unsubscribe from this list: Send an email message to LISTSERV@LISTSERV.METANEXUS.NET. In the body of your email, write: UNSUB SOPHIA. This method requires verification by an email sent to your address.


Did you enjoy this article? ... Your donation is tax-deductible to the fullest extent of the law.

Separater


Published   2004.02.18
Comments: Share your thoughts on this article:
View / Add Comments ( 5 )
Printer-Friendly | Email This Article


©1997-2008 Metanexus Institute
www.metanexus.net
Politics by Other Means
Making Sense of Evolution